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NOTE
EQUAL PROTECTION:

MODES OF ANALYSIS IN THE

BURGER COURT
INTRODUCTION

The 1971-1976 Terms of the Supreme Court have produced
significant developments in equal protection. Among the more
important of these have been the modes of analysis employed in
this area of constitutional law. The Burger Court inherited from
its predecessor a rigid, two-tier model of equal protection.' In the
A two-tier or "new" equal protection evolved during the Warren Court era. No
mention was made of a bifurcated form of analysis in an important article appearing in
1949 which predicted the emergence of an active equal protection. Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rav. 341 (1949). The authors predicted,
however, that race would become a "forbidden classification." Id. at 352-59. In 1966,
Justice Harlan was still able to argue:
It is suggested that a different and broader equal protection standard
applies in cases where "fundamental liberties and rights are threatened"
• . . which would require a State to show a need greater than mere rational
policy to justify classifications in this area. No such dual-level test has ever
been articulated by this Court, and I do not believe that any such approach
is consistent with the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause . ...
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 660-61 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also
Justice Harlan's dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969).
More recently, Justice Stevens has indicated an unwillingness to accept the two-tier
analysis.
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not require the courts to apply one standard of
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases. Whatever
criticism may be levelled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at least
three such standards applies with the same force to a double standard.
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion. I also suspect that a careful explanation of the reasons motivating particular decisions may contribute more to an identification of that
standard than an attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing terms ...
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 464 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Indeed, nothing on the face of the fourteenth amendment compels two-tier analysis.
For most of its history, equal protection has had only one level of scrutiny, today's version
of minimum scrutiny. E.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). This low degree of scrutiny was
particularly appropriate for economic regulation, the area in which equal protection was
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Warren Court era, minimum scrutiny almost always resulted in
upholding the legislation under attack, while strict scrutiny had
the opposite effect. 2 Since the outcome of a two-tier analysis was
foreordained by the level of scrutiny applied, the real contest
centered on whether or not the classifications or interests at stake
called for minimum or strict scrutiny. The Burger Court has radically altered this game by closing the door on the recognition of
"new" suspect classifications and fundamental, constitutional
interests.3 Constitutional inquiry now focuses more meaningfully
on the means and ends of legislation to ascertain whether or not
it will pass muster under the appropriate level of scrutiny.4 Unlike
most often applied in the early part of the twentieth century. The fourteenth amendment,
however, was adopted in response to a more invidious form of discrimination-racial
discrimination. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Speculation as to
the need for a higher standard of review was expressed in 1938 when Justice Stone suggested that the presumption of constitutionality should be given a narrower scope in the
case of legislation which discriminates against "discrete and insular minorities." United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Several years later, the
Court announced "that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect" and would be subject "to the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). This stricter level of review has also been
applied to legislation impinging on fundamental rights, such as voting. Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). For commentary see Note, The Mandatefor a New
Equal ProtectionModel, 24 CATH. U.L. Rxv. 558 (1975); Note, Developments in the Law,
Equal Protection, 82 HAsv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969); Note, A Question of Balance:
Statutory ClassificationsUnder the Equal Protection Clause, 26 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1973).
1 Chief Justice Burger expressed his displeasure with these automatic results in Dunn
v. Blumstein:
Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "compelling state
interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state
law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt
one ever will, for it demands nothing less than perfection.
405 U.S. 331, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Professor Gunther expressed the
same observation in 1972:
The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations
evoked the aggressive "new" equal protection, with scrutiny that was
"strict" in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the deferential "old"
equal protection reigned, with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none
in fact.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HLv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)
(footnote omitted). See also Shaman, The Rule of Reasonablenessin ConstitutionalAdjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the Establishment of a
Viable Theory of the Equal ProtectionClause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 159-60 (1975).
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Rodriguez].
In his analysis of the 1971 Term, Professor Gunther suggested that the Court would
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the Warren Court, the Burger Court has used minimum scrutiny
to strike down legislation- and has also upheld legislation against
strict scrutiny.'
Faced with a dramatic alteration in the modes of constitutional analysis, state and lower federal courts and commentators
have attempted to identify governing principles or patterns.7
Lower courts which cannot discern with reasonable clarity the
constitutional standards which should guide their decisions must
guess at the right answer, and must, sometimes, guess wrongly.8
Constitutional uncertainty also breeds an increased number of
appeals, resulting not only in congested dockets but also in
greatly increased expense for the litigants and the public. Legislators as well are caught in this web, since they must draft laws
conforming to prevailing constitutional standards. Part I of this
Note will examine developments in the area of strict scrutiny and
Part II will examine the alternatives to a rigid, two-tier equal
protection analysis.
I.

A.

STRICT SCRUTINY

Suspect Classifications
During the Warren Court era, the rigid, two-tier analysis left

focus on the "means" selected by a legislature, and that the Court would leave to the
discretion of legislatures, at least for equal protection purposes, the determination of
appropriate legislative "purposes" or "ends." Gunther, supra note 2. Thus, he postulated,
the Court would avoid inquiry which would be strongly suggestive of substantive due
process. While Gunther's model has won a following in the lower courts, e.g., Isakson v.
Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alas. 1976), it has not always carried the day in the Supreme Court.
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1071-72 (1974); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Two Eligibility Criteria Created by the 1971 Amendment to the
Food Stamp Act Ruled Unjustifiably Discriminatory and Violative of Due Process, 78
DICK. L. REV. 788 (1974).
E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-55 (1972).
* E.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 776 (1974).
One federal district court judge expressed his frustration in trying to find the answer
in this way: "A lower court faced with this line of cases has an uncomfortable feeling,
somewhat similar to a man playing a shell game who is not absolutely sure there is a pea."
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (footnote omitted),
rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378
(U.S. Apr. 19, 1977) (Rehnquist, J., not participating). An affirmance on certiorari by an
equally divided Court is entitled to no precedential weight. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188
(1972).
9 E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), rev'g 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1973), rev'g 367 F. Supp. 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

little doubt about the outcome, once it was clear whether strict
or minimum scrutiny would be applied. 9 Nevertheless, flexibility
was retained, inasmuch as the Warren Court was always somewhat foggy about which classifications or interests would turn a
case into one requiring strict scrutiny.10 Given the inclination to

' Gunther, supra note 2, at 8; see Note, Developments in the Law, Equal Protection,
82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969).
Classifications which have been found suspect are: race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); and nationality, Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). Interests which have been found to be fundamental in
the constitutional sense are: voting, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969), but see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 416 U.S. 719
(1973); travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), but see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393 (1975); and procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Whenever a
suspect classification or fundamental constitutional interest is impinged on, the legislation must satisfy three criteria: The means selected must be necessary; the means must
serve a compelling need; the means must serve a legitimate state purpose. Note, The Less
Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Analysis, A Justification,and
Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv. 971, 996-1006 (1974).
Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680, cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977), presents the Court with the
question it ducked earlier in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). That question is
whether affirmative action programs in which race is an intentional component must be
tested against and can satisfy the compelling interest standard. In Bakke the California
Supreme Court held that a state medical school's affirmative action program violated
federal equal protection because it did not satisfy the less restrictive alternative requirement of the compelling interest test. Broad language in a subsequent United States
Supreme Court decision, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 45 U.S.L.W. 4221 (U.S.
Mar. 1, 1977), offers hope that Bakke will either be overturned or, at a minimum, the
Court will set some standard by which affirmative action programs can be established to
conform to constitutional mandate. In United Jewish Organizations the Court upheld a
reapportionment plan which was admittedly drawn with racial considerations in order to
satisfy the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973 (1975). Although only the Chief Justice
dissented and Justice Marshall did not participate, there is no one thread which can be
pulled from the Court's decision. For himself and three others, Justice White observed
that the fourteenth amendment does not mandate "any per se rule against using racial
factors" in reapportionment. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4226. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
briefly discusses three objections to "benign discrimination." First, benign discrimination
may become a facade behind which disadvantageous treatment is perpetuated. If courts
are unable to distinguish the benign from the invidious programs, that would weigh
heavily against the use of affirmative action. Second, remedial programs might stimulate
racism and may stigmatize intended beneficiaries. Third, even a benign policy may seem
unjust to those adversely affected by it. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4229. Justice Brennan has elsewhere indicated that a carefully prepared affirmative action policy may satisfy the compelling interest standard. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
1* In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), the Court was faced with a portion of
the Texas Constitution which impinged on both the right to vote and the right to travel.
With a choice between resting its decision on either one of these interests, the Warren
Court did not clearly rest its decision on one or the other as the ratio decidendi. This soft

1976

EQUAL PROTECTION

strike down a particular legislative scheme, the Court always
seemed to be able to reach out and find a classification or interest
calling for strict scrutiny."
The Burger Court's rebellion against this flexible approach
blossomed in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez. 2 In that case the Court was squarely asked to find
that a school financing scheme which discriminated against poor
method of decision-writing was carried over by the Warren Court into areas where neither
the interest nor the classification has been held, specifically, to require strict scrutiny.
Thus, in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), the Court applied strict scrutiny when
confronted with a legislative scheme which required criminal appellants to file a transcript
in order to obtain full appellate review and where the state would not provide free transcripts to indigent appellants, thereby limiting the right of appeal. In applying strict
scrutiny, the Court did not indicate whether it was doing so because of poverty or the
criminal appeal process, or whether both were necessary to invoke this degree of review.
It was this fortuity that the Burger Court seized upon in Rodriguez. No prior Supreme
Court case had held poverty to be a suspect classification and, as far as the Burger Court
could help it, no one ever would. Similarly, no prior case had held education to be a
fundamental interest. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and all of its progeny,
up until Rodriguez, had involved both race and education. It had never, therefore, been
necessary to hold expressly that education was a fundamental interest. It came as something of a shock to find out, in Rodriguez, that education was not, of itself, sufficient to
invoke the higher tier of scrutiny. Thus, by making hard-nosed distinctions, as in
Rodriguez, the Burger Court has been able to escape from the broadest reaches of the
Warren Court legacy.
" Although the Warren Court's process was open-ended, it had in fact produced only
a smattering of interests or classifications which would, either alone or in combination,
invoke strict scrutiny. See discussion in notes 9-10 supra.
"1 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The California Supreme Court reached a result diametrically
opposed to Rodriguez on state equal protection grounds. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (Serrano II).
As Serrano I makes clear . . .our state equal protection provisions, while
"substantially the equivalent of" the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand an analysis different from
that which would obtain if only the federal standard were applicable. We
have recently stated in a related context: "[un the area of fundamental civil
liberties-which includes . . . all protections of the California Declaration
of Rights-we sit as a court of last resort, subject only to the qualification
that our interpretations may not restrict the guarantees accorded the national citizenry under the federal charter. . . .Accordingly, decisions of the
United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive
authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by
California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than
is guaranteed by California law.
Id. at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366. Justice Brennan's views on the use of independent state
grounds for decision are set forth in his article, Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Human Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

people created a suspect classification. Speaking through Justice
Powell, the Court declined the invitation. Prior cases involving
1 3 and Harper
poverty, such as Douglas v. California
v. Virginia
Board of Elections,1,were distinguished with the observation that
the factor which called strict scrutiny into play in those cases was
the "absolute deprivation" of a particular right, such as the right
to take a criminal appeal or access to the ballot, rather than a
classification based on poverty as such. Another factor which
Justice Powell indicated militated against recognition of poor
people as a suspect class was that the Texas financing plan did
not operate to discriminate solely against poor people nor against
all poor people. Justice Powell then articulated a standard to be
used in determining whether or not a particular classification
should be recognized as being suspect:
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."

Since announcing this test the Court has not recognized any new
classification as suspect."6
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
,s411 U.S. at 28. This was a transparent warning that the Burger Court would not
listen favorably to pleas for recognition of "new" suspect classes. Advocates for the recognition of sex and illegitimacy as suspect classifications were undeterred. Framed as it was,
Justice Powell's test did not foreclose recognition of either as a suspect class. To the
contrary, the test seemed to have been drawn with gender-based discrimination in mind,
at the very least; it is an understatement, rather than an exaggeration, to say that both
classes, but most especially women, have been saddled with disabilities, have been subjected to purposeful unequal treatment, and have been and still are, for the most part,
politically powerless. Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has said that women and illegitimates are special disfavorites of the law. Mathews v.Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976) (illegitimates); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (women). Nonetheless,
the Court has so far refused to hold, by a majority vote, that either classification is
suspect. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976) (sex); Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S.Ct. 2755 (1976)
(illegitimacy).
" In addition to sex and illegitimacy, the Court has declined to recognize age as a
suspect classification. Massachusetts Bd.of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
Although the Court has traditionally applied strict scrutiny to state programs discriminating against aliens, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court backed away
from this degree of scrutiny in a recent decision upholding a federal Medicare program
denying benefits to resident aliens who had been in the United States for less than five
"
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Justice Marshall sharply dissented from the Court's holding
and reasoning with respect to suspect classifications generally
and poverty in particular." In neither Griffin v. Illinois' nor
Douglas v. California," Marshall emphasized, did the offensive
scheme work an absolute deprivation of the right to take an appeal. In the one case, poor people were deprived of a transcript,
and in the other they were deprived of an attorney, but in both
cases poor people could still take an appeal. In Harperv. Virginia
Board of Elections,0 the poll tax discriminated not merely
years. Mathews v. Diaz, 96 S. Ct. 1883 (1976). The denial of benefits was upheld as a
reasonable fiscal measure based on the plenary power of Congress to regulate aliens.
There continues to be disquiet within the Court over the treatment to be accorded
gender-based classifications. Of the four-member plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), composed of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White, which
would have designated sex as a suspect class, Justice Douglas no longer is on the Court.
Of the three members who expressed a desire in that case to await the fate of the Equal
Rights Amendment, Justices Blackmun and Powell would evaluate gender-based classifications by a "middle-tier" approach. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 463-64 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring); 97 S. Ct. at 466 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his majority opinion in
Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976), Justice Blackmun held that illegitimates should
not be treated as a suspect class because illegitimacy does not carry the same obvious
badges as do race and sex, nor has discrimination against illegitimates ever approached
the severity or pervasiveness of legal and political discrimination against women or blacks.
96 S. Ct. at 2762. Given the parallels between race and sex which Justice Blackmun drew
in Mathews v.Lucas, it may be that he would now vote to find sex a suspect class. Even
if he were so inclined, there would still be no more than four votes to that effect. Justice
Stevens has dissociated himself from two-tier analysis altogether, Craig v. Boren, 97 S.
Ct. 451, 464-65 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring), and would not, presumably, add the fifth
vote which would be necessary for a majority of the Court to hold sex to be a suspect
classification. The Chief Justice, and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart have held
fast to their position that sex is not a suspect class. Each of the four wrote an opinion in
Craig v. Boren, supra. The majority opinion by Justice Brennan in Craig v. Boren is also
interesting in that it suggests a more than minimal, but less than strict, scrutiny of a
gender-based classification. It may be postulated that the "middle-tier" test for genderbased discrimination set out for the majority by Brennan in this case is not the "retreat"
from the plurality position of Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), over which
Justice Rehnquist rejoices in Craig. If the Equal Rights Amendment is passed, it is difficult to see how the Court could avoid holding sex to be suspect. On the other hand, in
view of the difficulties which the ERA is encountering, members of the Court seem to feel
that by adopting a "middle-tier" test for gender-based discrimination now, and even
assuming the ERA then fails, sex classifications would not be relegated to the same
superficial minimal scrutiny analysis which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist advocate in their separate dissents in Craig v. Boren. Further signs of internal Court disagreement over the definition of sex discrimination are evident in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
'
411 U.S. at 117-24 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" 351 U.S. 12 (1956), limited by United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976).
" 372 U.S. 353 (1963), limited by Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
2 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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against poor people who were unable to pay but it also operated
to prevent from voting those who simply failed to pay, although
able to do so. The Court struck down both aspects of the poll tax.
Justice Marshall pointed out that these cases, upon which Justice
Powell relied, did not support a holding that a classification is
suspect only if it works -an absolute deprivation of some right.
Indeed, Justice Marshall said, an analysis of past decisions
proved that the Court had focused on the relevance of the classification to the right denied. 2 In Rodriguez, Justice Marshall would
have looked at the relevance of the taxable wealth of a school
district to the interests of school children in the education they
would receive. Since the discrimination effected by such a classification was a function of group wealth, rather than personal
wealth, and in no way reflected the individual's abilities or needs,
it was, Justice Marshall believed, invidious. Moreover, even
within the terms of Justice Powell's test, poor people were politically powerless to effect a more equitable financing scheme
against certain opposition from a political majority opposing
higher taxation. For these reasons Justice Marshall would have
found the wealth-related classification affecting education in
22
Rodriguez suspect.
Basic to understanding strict scrutiny in the Burger Court is
a thorough understanding of Rodriguez. Its significance is less in
its holding, though important, and even less in the test of suspectness that it enunciates and which Justice Marshall deflates; the
true significance is the tone it sets-an inhospitable climate in
which strict scrutiny stops growing and begins to shrink. In this
atmosphere pleas for the recognition of sex2 3 and illegitimacy 4 as
The highly suspect character of classifications based on race, nationality, or alienage is well established. The reasons why such classifications
call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups
have frequently been recognized as "discrete and insular minorities" who are
relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political process. Moreover, race, nationality, or alienage is 'in most circumstances irrelevant' to
any constitutionally acceptable purpose." Instead, lines drawn on such bases
are frequently the reflection of historic prejudices rather than legislative
rationality.
411 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). See also
Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
411 U.S. at 120-24.
21 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). At least two state courts have held
sex to be suspect-California and Washington. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485
29
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suspect classifications have not moved a majority of the Court.
Spurious as Justice Powell's three-pronged test for suspectness
may be, its message is clear: No more suspect classes!
B.

FundamentalInterests

The Warren Court's catalogue of fundamental interests was
neither large nor well-defined. '5 Again, it was this weakness which
the Burger Court attacked through Justice Powell in Rodriguez.
In his opinion, Justice Powell moved quickly to defuse arguments
that education is a constitutionally protected fundamental interest. He did not directly attack the importance of education. Instead, he undercut the supports on which this claim to extraordinary constitutional protection rested. Since the close of the era
of substantive due process, the Court has been loath to find substantive rights in the fourteenth amendment, 6 an onus shared by
equal protection.27 Emphasizing this backdrop, Justice Powell
announced another test:
P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1973).
See generally B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. ROSS, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975); Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The ERA: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971); Ginsburg,
Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. Ev. 1 (1975); Johnston, Sex Discrimination
and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 235 (1975); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court- 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 617 (1974); Lombard, Sex: A
Classificationin Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1355 (1975); Note, Geduldig
v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classificationsand the Definition of Sex'Discrimination,75 COLUM.
L. Ev. 441 (1975); Note, The Supreme Court 1974 Term and Sex-Based Classifications:
Avoiding a Standard of Review, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 375 (1975).
24 Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974). For commentary on the status of illegitimates see Gray & Rudovsky, The Court
Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liab. Ins. Co., 118 U. PA. L. Ev. 1 (1969); Krause, Equal Protectionfor the Illegitimate,
65 MICH. L. Ev. 477 (1967); Lee, The Changing American Law Relating to Illegitimate
Children, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 415 (1975); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection,
49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 479 (1974).
2 See notes 9-10 supra.
" Among the most noted substantive due process cases are Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The doctrine fell into
constitutional disrepute in the mid-1930's, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), and has since been buried many times over, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963). To this day, however, black-robed justices denounce the reappearance of this
doctrine, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 467-68 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See also Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection:A Polemical Approach,
58 VA. L. REv. 1489 (1972).
" "Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause confers
no substantive rights and creates no substantive liberties." San Antonio Independent
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Thus, the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is
not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance
of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be
found by weighing whether education is as important as the right
to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right
to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.?

Applying this test, Justice Powell concluded that education is not
a fundamental, constitutional right. It is not expressly guaranteed and he could find no basis for implying its guarantee. In
particular, he rejected the "nexus theory" that education was
impliedly guaranteed because of its central importance to the
meaningful exercise of other guaranteed rights, such as freedom
of expression and voting. Moreover, he added, even assuming
education is essential to the exercise of these rights, this is not to
say that the Constitution guarantees to each the most "effective
speech or the most informed legislative choice. 2 To the extent
there was any bare, minimum quantity of education necessary to
exercise other constitutional rights, the Texas financing scheme,
he held, did at least that much. By anyone's reading, Justice
Powell's opinion is a studied effort to communicate the Court's
unwillingness to expand fundamental interests beyond voting,
travel, and procreation.
Justice Marshall's dissent is logically less compelling on this
point than his critique of the Court's treatment of suspect classifications. The difference between Justice Marshall and the majority is that Justice Marshall accepts the "nexus theory"-the more
closely the interest is tied to other fundamental rights, the more
searching the scrutiny it must withstand. 0 While this argument
has appeal and may serve to explain Warren Court strict scrutiny
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
Giving full force to this logic would go a long way toward undermining the fundamental
right status of interests such as procreation and travel. Goodpaster, The Constitutionand
FundamentalRights, 15 Aiz. L. REv. 479, 502 (1973).
2 411 U.S. at 33-34. The California Supreme Court rejected this analysis and found
education to be a fundamental right based on the state's equal protection guarantees in
Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 367 (1976).
411 U.S. at 36.
3 Id. at 110-17. Justice Marshall did not contend that the Warren Court had ever held
public education to be constitutionally required. He argued that education has a special
status in light of itsclose relationship to individual development and the exercise of
constitutional rights. Id. at 111.
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decisions, such as Griffin v. Illinois,31it is more a matter of philosophical orientation than settled constitutional doctrine.2 Justice
Marshall's flexible approach to the identification of fundamental
interests is in sharp contrast to the narrow standard adopted by
the Burger Court majority. This narrow standard allows the
Burger Court to confine the holdings of Warren Court decisions
to their facts without the discomfort of overruling precedent. At
the same time, a begrudging, narrow standard for the identification of fundamental interests has the benefit of relative certainty
in application. Moreover, an articulated standard lends itself
more readily to the semblance of intellectual and constitutional
integrity than an ad hoc balancing test which may appear to be,
if it is not in fact, arbitrarily manipulated to fit the facts of the
case.
C. Ignoring Precedent
While no fundamental interest or suspect classification bequeathed to the Burger Court has been specifically abandoned,
the legacy has not always been faithfully applied. From time to
time the Court has clearly "distinguished" controlling precedent
on specious or wholly unarticulated grounds. Two decisions,
Sosna v. Iowas and Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District,34 illustrate this approach.
Sosna involved a challenge to Iowa's one-year residency requirement for divorce. It was argued that the scheme penalized
the right to travel in violation of equal protections' and hence
should be tested against the compelling interest standard.3 Al351 U.S. 12 (1956).
= Justice Marshall's dissent is actually an elaborate development of what has been
described as a "sliding-scale" balancing test in equal protection in counterpoint to the
rigid, two-tier equal protection. See text accompanying notes 103-14, 142-46 infra. Justice
Stewart labeled Justice Marshall's dissent as "imaginative." 411 U.S. at 59.
419 U.S. 393 (1975).
410 U.S. 719 (1973).
3 Legislation which impinges on the right of persons to engage in interstate movement should be measured by the strict scrutiny standard. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
u It was also urged that the legislation created an irrebuttable, conclusive presumption violating due process. 419 U.S. at 409. For an examination of this doctrine see text
accompanying notes 49-85 infra. Justice Rehnquist rejected this claim, observing that
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), should not be construed as prohibiting bona fide
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though the logic of prior cases considering durational residency
requirements would seem to require strict scrutiny here, 37 Justice
Rehnquist dismissed those cases as not controlling, because, in
his estimation, the residency requirements in those cases were
only justified by administrative convenience and fiscal considerations. He urged that Iowa's interest in maintaining the integrity
of its dissolution decrees against collateral attack in sister states
was a different and, therefore, satisfactory ground of justification.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is analysis by misdirection, artfully inviting analysis of the legislation by the wrong
standard and then concluding that the legislation satisfies that
standard. He achieved this result by giving an obscure answer to
the question of whether strict scrutiny had been satisfied or even
applied.
We therefore hold that the state interest in requiring that those
who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the
State, as well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the likelihood of collateral attack, requires a different resolution of the constitutional issue presented than was the case in Shapiro, supra,Dunn,

supra, and Maricopa County, supra. 8

The statement that this case "requires a different resolution of
the constitutional issue" can be interpreted in either of two diametrically opposed ways. Does he mean here, that unlike
Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County, the scheme satisfies strict
scrutiny? While the opinion does not say so directly, the answer
must be no. The compelling interest standard is satisfied only if
the state has chosen "means that do not unnecessarily burden
constitutionally protected interests. ' 3 9 Justice Rehnquist made
residency requirements, citing Stares v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), which upheld a one year residency requirement for students
qualifying for in-state tuition rates. Notwithstanding the state's monopoly on the divorce
apparatus as the only legal means of dissolving a marriage relationship, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), and the severe hardship which a one year delay may impose,
Justice Rehnquist found it unnecessary to require the state to make an individualized
determination of residency for persons seeking divorce. 419 U.S. at 410.
31"Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes
a compelling state interest." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638 (1969). For commentary on durational residence requirements for divorce see Wurfel, Jet Age Domicil: The
Semi-Demise of DurationalResidence Requirements, 11 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 349, 40712 (1975).
419 U.S. at 409.
" Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 263. See also Dunn v. Blumstein,
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no effort to show that the Iowa statute met this burden, as well
he could not, since the state could determine the fact of residence
by other means, i.e., by individualized determinations.'0 The
Iowa scheme, therefore, would fail the compelling interest test.
Therefore, it must be assumed that when Justice Rehnquist
spoke of a different resolution of the constitutional issue, he was
referring to the use of minimum scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny. His argument that Iowa's statute was justified by reasons
of full faith and credit and comity, rather than administrative
and budgetary considerations," goes to the question of whether
the proferred justifications satisfy the appropriate level of scrutiny, not to the more basic question of which level of scrutiny is
appropriate.'" Notwithstanding prior cases implicating the right
to travel-which had held that strict scrutiny must be appliedJustice Rehnquist applied minimum scrutiny without articulating standards for not applying strict scrutiny. It seems apparent
that strict scrutiny was ignored, not because it was inappropriate
in light of the constitutional interest involved, but because the
Justices did not like the results its application would bring.
The Burger Court has also retreated from the use of strict
scrutiny in the case of voting. In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake
405 U.S. at 343; Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. at 627. For a general
discussion see Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An
Analysis, A Justification,and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. Rav. 971 (1974).
10419 U.S. at 424 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
' See text accompanying note 37 supra.
,2 The dissent was sharply critical of the majority's approach.
The Court's failure to address the instant case in these terms [strict
scrutiny] suggests a new distaste for the mode of analysis we have applied
in this corner of equal protection law. In its stead, the Court has employed
what appears to be an ad hoc balancing test . . . . I am concerned not only
about the disposition of this case, but also about the implications of the
majority's analysis for other divorce statutes and for durational residency
requirement cases in general.
419 U.S. at 419 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Prior to Sosna, a number of state and lower
federal courts had considered challenges to other divorce statutes with durational residency requirements. When the question was presented to the Alaska Supreme Court, it
held all residency requirements to be prima facie invalid as infringing on the fundamental
constitutional right of travel. State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alas. 1974). For commentary
see McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental Right to Travel or
"Newcomers" as a Suspect Class, 28 VAND. L. REv. 987, 1014-16 (1975); Comment, Sosna
v. Iowa: A New Equal ProtectionApproach to DurationalResidency Requirements?, 22
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1313 (1975).
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43 the Court applied
Basin Water Storage District,
minimum scrutiny to uphold a voting system which restricted the right to vote
in water district elections to resident landowners." Four years
earlier, in Kramer v. Union Free School District," the Warren
Court had applied strict scrutiny to a plan which deprived nonproperty owners and those who were not parents or guardians of
public school children from voting on school district affairs. Because the right to vote is preservative of other rights, Kramer
held, exclusions from the franchise must serve a compelling state
interest. Salyer avoids this rule by creating a special purpose
district exception. When this exception applies, the limitation on
the franchise need only satisfy minimum scrutiny.
The grounds by which the Court in Salyer distinguished
Kramer's requirement for strict scrutiny are not sound. Justice
Rehnquist said that the water district in Salyer was so specialized
that it affected only the interests of a few people within its geographical boundaries. Moreover, the district's purposes were limited to flood control and irrigation, and the economic burdens of
the district did not fall on all district residents. He also noted that
the district did not have general governmental powers. Because
of these considerations, he found that the restrictions on the right
to vote were "rationally based."" But, why he applied minimum
scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is not satisfactorily explained.
The differences in the types of districts at issue in Salyer and
Kramer, the fact the Court relied upon in justifying different
standards, are insignificant in constitutional terms-a fact the
Court made abundantly clear in another of its decisions,
Rodriguez. In the latter case, the Court held education was not a
constitutionally protected interest and did not require anything
more than minimum scrutiny. The different standards of review
in Salyer and Kramer thus cannot be justified on the ground that
the educational interest involved in Kramer is entitled to
special protection. Stripped of collateral issues, the constitutionally significant interest in both Salyer and Kramer is the right
,3410 U.S. 719 (1973). Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement
Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973), was a companion case.
" Among those excluded from the franchise were resident lessees of farmland and all
landowners who were not farmers.
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
410 U.S. at 734-35.
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to vote. There is no constitutional basis for protecting the right
to vote in one kind of district more than in another. In the absence
of a constitutional basis for applying different standards, the different results in Salyer and Kramer can only be explained as a
conscious decision to ignore precedent. Ironically, it is this same
ad hoc approach to determining the appropriate level of review
which the Burger Court majority denounced in Rodriguez.47
Both Sosna and Salyer reflect disturbing trends. Each case
concerned fundamental constitutional rights, recognized as such
in Rodriguez. Precedent called for the application of strict scrutiny. Yet, in neither case did the majority articulate sound reasons for ignoring precedent. This approach to constitutional adjudication is unprincipled and likely to cause unnecessary uncertainty in future cases. 8 Moreover. at a time when members of the
,1 Justice Rehnquist's opinion stresses the "special district" aspect of a flood control
and irrigation project. Two calamities in the western United States during 1976 involving
flood control projects illustrate the interests of all residents in the affairs of such "special
districts." The collapse of the Teton Dam in Idaho destroyed millions of dollars of property, farmland and non-farmland, in the flood plain below the dam. In Colorado, a flash
flood in Big Thompson Canyon took over 100 lives and destroyed millions of dollars of
property. Residents of these and similar districts can be expected to be less than enamored
by proposals which restrict the franchise that determines the development of similar
enterprises. Justice Rehnquist's minimum scrutiny standard would sacrifice these concerns too readily. It is precisely this danger that the Court sought to avoid by its holding
in Kramer, a danger which has been let in the back door by Salyer's "special district"
exception. The Salyer decision is to be admired neither for its specific holding nor for its
unarticulated grounds for refusing to apply strict scrutiny to legislation which disenfranchises affected citizens.
11 The remarks of Professor Wechsler speak well to this problem, although made in
the context of the shared powers of the three coordinate branches of government:
The Courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly before
them to review the actions of other branches in the light of constitutional
provisions, even though the action involves value choices, as invariably action does. In doing so, however, they are bound to function otherwise than
as a naked power organ; they participate as courts of law. This calls for facing
how determinations of this kind can be asserted to have any legal quality.
The answer, I suggest, inheres primarily in that they are-or are obliged to
be-entirely principled. A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind,
is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons
that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved.
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAav. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959).
Neither Sosna nor Salyer meets this standard. Another commentator put it this way:
"According to common understanding, the general rule is that an appellate court is
obliged to follow, or else somehow distinguish, its own earlier decisions, or at the least
those elements of the case known as the ratio decidendi. " Wise, The Doctrine of Store
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Court have expressed concern over the Court's growing docket,
this approach to decisionmaking can only encourage more appeals in areas of law that heretofore appeared settled.

II.

ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL Two-TIER ANALYSIS

The Burger Court's rejection of a rigid, two-tier equal protection analysis has been most evident in those cases where strict
scrutiny has not been applied. For a time the Court experimented
with the conclusive presumption doctrine of due process. Apparently, because this doctrine became little more than a surrogate
for strict scrutiny and threatened to invalidate just about any law
to which it was applied, this experiment seems to have been
abandoned. Meanwhile, the Court has used minimum scrutiny
with a vigor which, at times, clearly exceeds its deferential reputation. The problem lies in understanding what gives rise to the
Court's varying degrees of analysis.
A.

Conclusive Presumptions

An irrebuttable presumption exists if proof of one fact is
conclusive evidence of the existence of a second fact. Constitutionally, the doctrine has its roots in the due process clause.
Except for the Burger Court's brief fling in the area, the conclusive presumption doctrine has had an obscure career.4"
Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1043, 1045 (1975). It is true, of course, that constitutional
holdings are more open to reexamination than those based on nonconstitutional issues.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 472 (1957). Nonetheless, in Sosna
and Salyer we find Justice Rehnquist engaging in the kind of decisionmaking by "brute
force" to which he objected in Weber. 406 U.S. at 177. See also Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1976).
,1 The oldest and "best" known of the first generation of conclusive presumption
cases is Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926). That case held unconstitutional a
statute which made any gift within six years of death taxable as though it had been made
in anticipation of death. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), struck down a similar
statute as applied to a young man who had made a gift and was then struck dead by a
bolt of lightning. Among other conclusive presumption cases are: Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring); United States
v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934); Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928). Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), struck down a portion of the Texas Constitution, relying
on equal protection instead of the conclusive presumption doctrine. Texas denied members of the armed forces the right to vote in Texas as long as they were in the military, if
they had not been Texas residents before joining the military. The more recent conclusive
presumption, due process cases can be, and probably should have been, analyzed in terms
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Stanley v. Illinois ° is the first of the truly important conclusive presumption cases decided by the Burger Court.' The Illinois
statute in question made an unwed father unfit to retain the
custody of his children after the death of the mother. Although
he might be able to regain custody of his children as their guardian or by adoption, legally he was a stranger to them. No evidence
was admissible to prove fitness to retain custody. Justice White's
majority opinion, which alternated between equal protection and
due process analyses, held that this administrative shortcut to
determining parental unfitness deprived both the father and his
children of due process. 5 Chief Justice Burger would have
reached an opposite result because he could find the word
"presumption" nowhere in the statute. 3
With Vlandis v. Kline" this new doctrine began to take
of equal protection. See Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or
Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800 (1974).
o 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of Putative Father's ConstitutionalRights, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1581 (1972).
, Stanley was preceded by Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). No one dissented from
Bell, but Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun concurred in the result.
Bell invalidated a portion of the Georgia motor vehicle responsibility statute which automatically suspended the license of an uninsured motorist who had been involved in an
accident and who was unable to or did not post a security. No hearing was held on the
question of fault before the license was suspended and any offer of evidence regarding fault
was not accepted. Thus postured, the case had heavy overtones of the procedural due
process seen in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). As eventually developed by the Burger Court, the conclusive presumption doctrine
leaned more toward substantive due process. See Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463 (1973).
5 Among the decisions subsequent to Stanley which have arrived at similar results
are Willmott v. Decker, 56 Hawaii 462, 541 P.2d 13 (1975), and Phillips v. Horlander, 535
S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1975). California has extended Stanley to uphold the right of a putative
father to prove that he is the natural father, of a child born of a woman married to another
man, in order to rebut the strong presumption that a child born to a married woman is a
legitimate child of that marriage. In re Lisa R., 13 Cal. 3d 636, 532 P.2d 123, 119 Cal. Rptr.
475 (1975). See Comment, In re Lisa R.-Limiting the Scope of the Conclusive Presumption Doctrine, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 377 (1976). New York has refused to grant the unwed
natural father a right to prevent the mother from putting the child up for adoption for
the reason that the father could use this veto power to harm both the mother and the child.
In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975). See Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection-Rightsof the
Unwed Father-Consentto Adoption, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 312 (1976). But see Adoption
of Walker, 360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976).
53Justice Blackmun joined in this dissent. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not
participate.
"4412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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shape. This case held unconstitutional the residencynonresidency classifications employed by many states to determine who would be required to pay higher tuition at state colleges
and universities. Connecticut classified students as state residents or as nonresidents at the time of their applications for admission. Once designated as a nonresident, students were required to pay nonresident tuition rates for as long as they attended the state institution. Justice Stewart rejected the proferred justifications of administrative convenience and fiscal conservation. Due process, he said, would not permit a permanent
classification of nonresidency when such classification
is not necessarily or universally true in fact . . . when the State has
reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.
Rather, standards of due process require that the State allow such
an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he
55
is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates.

It was not the existence of two classifications which offended due
process but the absence of any means to rebut the classification
which imposed a heavier financial burden on those initially classified as nonresidents. While the state could maintain the basic
classifications, it had to provide some means for determining
which students had, subsequent to their admission, become bona
5
fide state residents. 6
Dissatisfaction within the Court with this mode of constitutional analysis is evident in the concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice White's concurrence was based on his finding that
the legislation invidiously discriminated against several classes of
bona fide state residents. He objected to the Court's use of due
process, finding it a surrogate form of analysis for a problem
rooted in equal protection. 7 Chief Justice Burger's dissent also
Id. at 452. The plaintiff in this case had married a life-long Connecticut resident,
had acquired a Connecticut driver's license and car registration, and had registered to vote

in Connecticut.
" The Court noted that it had previously upheld a Minnesota statute which allowed
students to prove they had become bona fide residents and were therefore qualified for
in-state tuition rates. Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), aff'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.
Minn. 1970). Presence in Minnesota for one year was required before evidence of bona fide
residency would be accepted.
11 Justice White also concluded that the Court was using a spectrum of standards in

equal protection cases rather than a two-tier model:
[lit must now be obvious, or has been all along, that, as the Court's assess-
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argued that the Court was applying equal protection and had
"sub silentio" adopted strict scrutiny without stating what constitutionally protected interest had been impinged. In addition,
he argued that the Court's reasoning threatened thousands of
statutes employing presumptions similar to the one held unconstitutional in this case. This concern was amplified in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent. For him the majority opinion was a return
to substantive due process."
Disagreement over the use of the conclusive presumption
doctrine intensified in Cleveland Board of Educationv. LaFleur."
This case upheld the challenge by pregnant teachers to school
policies which compelled them to go on leave several months
before the time they were to give birth. By way of defense, the
schools argued that these arbitrary dates approximated periods
during which pregnant teachers would be incapacitated and unfit
to teach. In addition, the schools claimed that these policies facilitated classroom continuity and the school board's search for suitable replacement teachers.A0 The majority of the Court found that
ment of the weight and value of the individual interest escalates, the less
likely it is that mere administrative convenience and avoidance of hearings
or investigations will be sufficient to justify what otherwise would appear to
be irrational discriminations.
412 U.S. at 459.
" See note 26 supra.
5' 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Subsequent to Vlandis but prior to LaFleur,the Court decided
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Murry struck down an
amendment to the Food Stamp Act which denied benefits to any household in which there
resided another person who was ineligible for food stamps. The Court reasoned that a
presumption which conclusively made all individuals in such a household ineligible for
food stamps "is often contrary to fact," and therefore violated due process. Murry is
significant, less for this holding than because it is practically indistinguishable from a
companion case, United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), which
struck down another provision in the Food Stamp Act amendment, applying equal protection rather than due process. When read together, these cases show the conclusive presumption doctrine to be a transparent substitute for equal protection. Note, Irrebuttable
Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1173, 1190 (1974); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Two Eligibility Criteria Created
by the 1971 Amendment to the Food Stamp Act Ruled Unjustifiably Discriminatoryand
Violative of Due Process, 78 DICK. L. REv. 788 (1974).
o At the district court level, the schools urged other reasons in support of this policy,
such as a desire to save children from seeing an obviously pregnant woman. 414 U.S. at
641 n.9. These arguments were not pursued in the Supreme Court. Although the case came
to the Court solely on constitutional grounds, the Court noted that the policies in question
presumptively violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp.
II, 1972), and regulations issued pursuant thereto by the Equal Employment Opportunity
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these policies impinged on liberties regarding marriage and family life, liberties within the ambit of due process. Again, with
Justice Stewart at the helm, the Court said that the presumptions of incapacity and unfitness were neither necessarily nor
universally true, and, therefore, impermissibly burdened the decision to beget children. Administrative convenience "alone"
could not justify what was otherwise a violation of due process.
The concurring and dissenting opinions clearly rejected the
conclusive presumption doctrine in theory and as applied. Justice
Powell concurred, relying on equal protection.
If the Court nevertheless uses "irrebuttable presumption" reasoning selectively, the concept at root often will be something else masquerading as a due process doctrine. That something else, of course,
is the Equal Protection Clause.8 '

It is in Justice Rehnquist's dissent, however, that the future of
this doctrine is told. He outlines two irreconcilable goals in American law and its English antecedents. At the one extreme is individualized decisionmaking in the administration of governmental
programs in order to meet the equities of each individual case. At
the other extreme is lawmaking by broad classifications, without
consideration of individual equities, which avoids decisionmaking by politically unaccountable, faceless bureaucrats capable of
imposing, even if only subjectively, their own preferences and
discriminations. More simply, the difference between individualized determinations and legislation by classification is the classic
conflict between the rule of individuals and the rule of law. Justice Rehnquist finds in the conclusive presumption doctrine an
attack on the essence of lawmaking itself. Legislating, by definition, involves drawing lines between those who shall be included
and those who shall be excluded from a governmental program.
To deny this power to legislatures is a return to the era of substantive due process.2 Moreover, the idea of individually tailored governmental decisions is a Trojan horse. Hidden within are millions
Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975).
414 U.S. at 638-40 n.8. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), the Supreme
Court held that the EEOC regulation referred to in LaFleur and Geduldig, in so far as it
applied to pregnancy disabilities, is an inaccurate construction of Title VII.
"
62

OKLA.

414 U.S. at 652.
Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions And/Or Substantive Due Process of Law, 27

L. REv. 151, 160-61 (1974).
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of bureaucrats. Given the choice between demanding that legislatures draft laws discretely and requiring that governmental decisions be determined on the facts of each case, Justice Rehnquist's
3
arguments carry the day.
In addition to this doctrinal debate, the conclusive presumption doctrine posed two other problems. First, what degree of
scrutiny is appropriate in cases applying this doctrine? Second,
when should this doctrine, rather than equal protection, be
applied?
Notable for its absence in Stanley, Vlandis, and LaFleur is
any discussion of the degree of scrutiny required by the conclusive
presumption doctrine. While two-tier analysis is commonly associated with equal protection, this form of analysis has a due process analogue. 4 To members of the Court65 and commentators6
alike, irrebuttable presumption analysis looked suspiciously like
strict scrutiny in disguise. Indeed, in the principal cases in which
the doctrine evolved, the objectives of administrative convenience and budgetary conservation were quickly dismissed as totally inadequate justifications. 7
Faced with the emergence of a new due process doctrine,
which seemed to apply strict scrutiny, and always keeping in
mind the limitation placed on strict scrutiny in the equal protection context by Rodriguez, lower courts 8 and commentators9
13 Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer Equal Protection Continues, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 217, 229-30 (1975).
11E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See generally McCoy, Recent Equal
ProtectionDecisions-FundamentalRight to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?,
28 VANo. L. REv. 987, 988-95 (1975).
11 See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 460.
9, Canby, The Burger Court and the Validity of Classificationsin Social Legislation:
Currents of Federalism, 1975 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1, 25; Note, IrrebuttablePresumptions as
an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to LaFleur, 62 GEO. L.J. 1173 (1974);
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REv.
1534, 1534-36 (1974).
11For further discussions of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine see Bezanson,
Some Thoughts on the Emerging IrrebuttablePresumption Doctrine, 7 INo. L. REv. 644
(1974); Chase, The PrematureDemise of Irrebuttable Presumptions,47 U. CoLO. L. REv.
653 (1976); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions:An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449
(1975); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-The Conclusive PresumptionDoctrine, 54 N.C.L.
REv. 460 (1976).
" Totally bedeviled, some lower courts took up the practice of basing their holdings
on alternative constitutional grounds, equal protection and conclusive presumptions, thus
proving again that the conclusive presumption doctrine is in reality little more than a
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searched for the alchemic secret which seemed to turn an otherwise pedestrian case of equal protection minimum scrutiny into
one of conclusive presumptions. Proof that conclusive presumption analysis would not reveal a principled ground of difference
from equal protection analysis came in two cases striking down
amendments to the Food Stamp Act.7" The amendments were
aimed at eliminating abuses in the Food Stamp program, but
Congress sought to achieve this objective by means which were
more clearly aimed at harming politically unpopular
groups-college students and "hippies." Factually, the problems
presented by the challenges to these amendments were nearly
identical. In one case, Congress sought to deny food stamps to any
household which contained a person over 18 years of age who had
been claimed as a federal income tax dependent by a person
ineligible for food stamps in the two previous years. The statute
was aimed at college children of wealthy parents. The scheme,
however, excluded many who were otherwise eligible for food
stamps and who were disqualified only because they lived in the
same household with someone who had been claimed as a tax
dependent. In the second case, Congress had sought to exclude
from the program any person who lived in a household containing
one or more unrelated persons. This scheme was aimed at
"hippies" but included many more. In the first case, the Court
struck down the legislation as an impermissible conclusive presumption while in the second case, decided on the basis of equal
protection, the Court held that a Congressional desire to harm a
discrete group was wholly irrational. In both cases the amendments were held to be overinclusive of those who were denied
benefits in light of the abuses which Congress sought to eradicate.
surrogate for equal protection. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed
as improvidently granted, 96 S. Ct. 1752 (1976); Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167
(S. & E.D.N.Y. 1974), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 421
U.S. 338 (1975).
11 "Since the weapon of irrebuttable presumption analysis is always available and is
inevitably lethal if applied to the full extent of its rhetoric, the question becomes one of
deterniining when and for what generally inarticulated reasons the Court will trot it out."
Canby, The Burger Court and the Validity of Classifications in Social Legislation: Currents of Federalism, 1975 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1, 25 (1975).
"' United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (conclusive presumption) and United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (equal
protection). For commentary see authorities cited in note 59 supra.
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Yet the two cases were decided on different constitutional
grounds. Search as one will, there is no reason to be found why
two identical problems should be decided on different constitutional grounds, unless the two forms of analysis are really the
same.
Thus, by the time of LaFleur, three fundamental problems
inhered in the conclusive presumption doctrine: Doctrinal disagreement over its legitimacy; uncertainty over the degree of scrutiny it required; and, difficulty in discerning when it, rather than
equal protection, should be applied. By 1975 a majority of the
Court was prepared to lay to rest this constitutional Dr. JekyllMr. Hyde routine, and in Weinberger v. Salfi,7' the Court, per
Justice Rehnquist, set out to limit the doctrine.7 2 In Weinberger,
the district court had ruled that a Social Security program which
provided benefits only to widows who had been married to the
deceased insured for more than nine months was unconstitutional
as creating a conclusive presumption that all marriages of shorter
duration had been fraudulently entered into for the purpose of
obtaining Social Security benefits. In reversing that decision, the
Supreme Court effectively dealt with the three problems inherent
in conclusive presumptions. First, the Court dealt with the legitimacy of the doctrine by holding it was to have no wider scope
than the holdings of prior cases in which it had been applied.
We think the District Court's extension of the holdings of
Stanley, Vlandis, and LaFleurto the eligibility requirement in issue
here would turn the doctrine of these cases into a virtual engine of
destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.73
71 422 U.S. 749 (1975), limited in sex discrimination cases by Califano v. Goldfarb,
45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1977). See note 139 infra.

72 Interestingly, Justice Stewart joined in Justice Rehnquist's opinion. It may be that
Justice Stewart, the author of the Court's opinions in Vlandis and LaFleurand the Justice
who seemed the strongest advocate of the new doctrine, has been convinced by the dissents
of prior cases.
11 422 U.S. at 772. It should be observed that prior cases were limited to their facts
but not overruled. They can, therefore, be relied upon in cases dealing with forms of
discrimination falling within their holdings. LaFleur was cited, subsequent to Salfi, as
authority in Turner v. Department of Employment Security & Bd. of Review, 423 U.S.
44 (1975). Turner overturned a Utah unemployment compensation statute which made
women ineligible for benefits over an 18-week period covering the 12 weeks prior to the
expected birth and for 6 weeks thereafter. Accord, Sylvara v. Industrial Comm'n, 550 P.2d
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Second, having limited the doctrine's scope, Justice Rehnquist
went on to announce what level of scrutiny would be applied to
these cases in the future. Henceforth , due process would be violated "'only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.' "" Individualized determinations are no longer necessary "when Congress can
rationally conclude not only that generalized rules are appropriate to its purposes and concerns, but also that the difficulties of
individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments
. . . they might be expected to produce."75 Third, having defined
the appropriate degree of review as minimum scrutiny, the Court
makes it unnecessary to determine when this doctrine, rather
than equal protection, should be applied, as both doctrines apply
the same degree of review and should produce identical results."
Any doubts that the Court had, for all practical purposes,
buried conclusive presumptions were put to rest during the
Court's 1975 Term. The Court ignored a perfect invitation to
apply this doctrine in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia,"7 passing the opportunity by in favor of equal protection.
At issue was the forced retirement of a police officer who had
passed a rigorous physical only four months earlier." The retirement schedule was justified by the need for assuring public protection through the "physical preparedness of . . . uniformed
officers." However, since the officer had recently been found
physically fit, the statutory presumption of unfitness at age 50
was obviously not universally true. The case was an appealing one
for the application of the conclusive presumption doctrine, since
the state already had a routine physical examination program as
a reasonable alternative means for ascertaining the critical fact
868 (Colo. 1976) (Sylvara is a rare example of a state's attorney general confessing error
on appeal and urging the state supreme court to rule a statute unconstitutional).
7, 422 U.S. at 768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). Federal
district court judges have found this statement a thinly veiled adoption of the "rational
basis" approach to equal protection. Alcala v. Bums, 410 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (S.D. Iowa
1976), on remand from 420 U.S. 575 (1975); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982,
989-93 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
11422 U.S. at 785.
1 Rebuttable presumptions do not raise constitutional problems unless the presumption itself is arbitrary. Lavine v. Milne, 96 S. Ct. 1010 (1976).
77 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
11Up to age 40 officers were examined every two years. Between 40 and 50, the officers
had to pass an even more rigorous physical every year.
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of fitness. The Court was careful to emphasize its respect for older
persons and the importance of employment.79 Nonetheless, applying equal protection, the Court upheld the statute. 0 Although
clearly applicable, at least in its pre-Salfi formulation, the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine was not even mentioned.
In another decision, Mathews v. Lucas,"' the Court sustained
a Social Security survivors' benefit scheme which disqualified
illegitimates if they could not show that the insured natural parent was living with or supporting them at the time of that parent's death. Legitimate children did not need to prove either fact.
Even though the program was overinclusive of those illegitimates
who were not dependent in fact, the Court upheld the classification on the ground of administrative convenience," clearly identifying the "applicable level of scrutiny" 3 as minimum scrutiny. 4
The Court's experiment with the conclusive presumption
doctrine was short lived. It was obvious almost from the beginning that the doctrine was a substitute for equal protection. In
its dissatisfaction with equal protection, the Court seemed to be
looking for an alternative ground of decision. As an alternative
ground, the conclusive presumption doctrine seemed promising.
In time, this new doctrine became more rigid than the doctrine
79 Comparing this case with LaFleur it isobvious that classifications based on sex are
especially disfavored by the Court. In LaFleur,the interference with employment was only
temporary. In Murgia, employment was permanently terminated. Although the impact
of the sex-based discrimination in LaFleurwas not as severe as the age-based discrimination in Murgia, the Court found an equal protection violation only in the case of sex
discrimination.
In dissent, Justice Marshall urged that the Court should have applied a slidingscale equal protection analysis rather than a two-tier analysis. He did not advocate conclusive presumption analysis. 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2568.
"
96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
Z Prior to Salfi, administrative convenience was an especially unpopular justification
in conclusive presumption cases.
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency
and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less,
and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (footnote omitted). In LaFleur the Court
added, "[Aidministrative convenience alone is insufficient to make valid what otherwise
is a violation of due process." 414 U.S. at 647.
96 S. Ct. at 2764, citing Salfi, 422 U.S. at 772.
" The dissenters would have sustained the attack on this legislation, relying on Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), which was decided on equal protection grounds.
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it was intended to supplement, and the Court decided to abandon
this new doctrine before it could gain wide application. Practically, as an evolving doctrine of constitutional law, the conclusive
presumption doctrine does not appear to have a future."5
B.

Minimum Scrutiny

While strict scrutiny has hardly been a paragon of stability,
and conclusive presumptions for a time engendered confusion,
they pale before the fate of "traditional," deferential, minimum
scrutiny in the Burger Court. Today, minimum scrutiny could be
likened to a patient who has undergone plastic surgery. Whether
the changes which have been wrought are merely cosmetic or are
more substantial is a question to which there may not yet be a
certain answer.
1. Economic Regulation
Most traditional discussions of minimum scrutiny somewhere make the observation that with one exception, Morey v.
Doud,86 the Warren Court never used this level of scrutiny to
invalidate legislation. Morey invalidated an Illinois statute regulating money orders which gave preferential treatment to American Express because of that corporation's acknowledged fiscal
integrity. Late in the 1975 Term, Morey was overruled in City of
New Orleans v. Dukes. 7 In the area of economic regulation,
Dukes held, only "invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary
act" will violate equal protection. The Court's language implies
that an especially wide berth will be afforded legislation regulating economics, apparently wider than will be allowed in matters
of social legislation. 9
In overruling Morey, the Court adopted the views set forth
in the dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurter in
Morey. In both Morey and Dukes the constitutional challenge
focused on legislative classifications which were reasonably based
See note 73 supra.
354 U.S. 457 (1957). But see Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
97 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976).
Id. at 2517, citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), which upheld a statute
limiting the practice of debt adjustment to attorneys. Dukes involved a city ordinance
limiting the number of pushcart vendors who could operate in an area of New Orleans to
those who had been so engaged for a specified number of years.
11 E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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on present facts and the legislative failure to provide for classification modifications in the event those facts changed in the future so as to make the present classification unreasonable. In
Morey the majority seized upon this legislative failure to provide
for modifications in the event of future changes as the ground for
holding the legislation was arbitrary. Justice Frankfurter objected to this speculative ground for ruling that the statute violated equal protection. Should that contingency ever arise, he
argued, there would be time enough to strike down the legislation.
Many times before, he urged, the Court had at one time found a
statute constitutional only to reach a different result when presented with changed circumstances. 0 As indicated by its adoption of this dissent in Dukes, the Court will, in future economic
regulation cases, look to the actual effects of legislation in determining its constitutionality, rather than speculating on abstractions and possibilities."
While prior decisions had indicated that the Court would not
strike down economic legislation unless it was "wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective," 9 there is a strong
suggestion in Dukes that in this area there will be an even more
deferential approach than is typical of low-tier scrutiny. 3 Two
implications suggest themselves from this case. First, if the
Burger Court adheres to the rhetoric of two-tier equal protection
1' 354

U.S. at 474.

91Justice Marshall did not join the Court's opinion in Dukes, but concurred in the
judgment without opinion. This is interesting because he has elsewhere indicated a strong
preference for upholding legislative judgments in the area of economic regulation.
I find it hard to understand why a statute which sends a man to prison and
deprives him of the opportunity even to be considered for treatment for his
disease of narcotics addiction, while providing treatment and suspension of
prison sentence to others similarly situated, should be treated under the
same minimal standards of rationality we apply to statutes regulating who
can sell eyeglasses or who can own pharmacies. This case does not involve
discrimination against business interests more than powerful enough to protect themselves in the legislative halls . ...
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's unwillingness to go along with a hard-and-fast rule in
this area may be understandable in view of his opposition to any form of rigid analysis
and his preference for a sliding-scale approach. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
92 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
" See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
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in its traditional formulation, then social legislation may also
come under this new, lowered level of scrutiny. Although there
may be spill-over to this effect, especially in cases where it is
difficult to determine whether the legislation is economic or social
in nature, this possibility does not seem to be what the Court had
in mind. A second interpretation might be that the Court has
abandoned or is setting the stage for an abandonment of two-tier
analysis. At the one extreme the Court could retain strict scrutiny
for suspect classifications and fundamental, constitutional interests. At the other extreme it would apply a highly deferential
minimum scrutiny in the field of economic regulation. Of course,
that leaves social legislation in the middle-but just where cannot be said. It may be that social legislation will still be reviewed
on the reasonable basis test of Dandridge v. Williams.94 Justice
Stewart's opinion in that case, however, begins with the premise
that there is no reason for judging social and economic legislation
by different standards under the equal protection clause." That
argument has been undercut by Dukes. In any case, the logic of
Justice Stewart's argument rings hollow, as the fourteenth
amendment was adopted in response to interferences with the
exercise of social rights. Business advocates obtained the benefits
of this amendment only by way of judicial afterthought. Regardless, government in a republic has as its raison d'etre the service
of its natural citizens, economics being only subsidiary means to
that end. Every reason exists, therefore, for subjecting social legislation to more exacting scrutiny than economic regulation. The
Court's decision in Dukes may pave the way for articulation of
an intensified standard of scrutiny in the area of social legislation.
While the Court seems to have in fact adopted such an approach
in some cases,9" it has done so while adhering to the rhetoric of a
rigid two-tier equal protection. The decision in Dukes makes it
easier, should the Court wish to seize the opportunity, to articulate or formalize a standard for reviewing social legislation which
conforms to what the Court has done in practice. Four of the
7 a 1976
concurring and dissenting opinions in Craig v. Boren,"
Id. at 487.
, Id. at 485-86.
E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
" 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), Justice Blackmun
"
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Term case involving sex discrimination, state that the thrust of
the majority's opinion is the establishment of a "middle-tier"
analysis for gender-based discrimination. It is of course entirely
possible, if not more likely, that Dukes represents a narrow exception to what will otherwise remain a two-tier form of equal protection." Nonetheless, the possibilities are intriguing.
2.
Scale

Gunther's Means-Oriented Test and Marshall's Sliding

Two models of a "newer" equal protection have emerged.
Professor Gunther's review of the 1971 Term led him to conclude
the Court had adopted a "means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred ground of decision."" He described the model as being
interventionist without applying strict scrutiny. 00 He predicted
that the Court would examine the means chosen to further a
particular legislative purpose, forsaking a review of legislative
purpose, the latter inquiry being too close to substantive due
process.'"' With respect to the intensity of review, the model
"would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative
means must substantially further legislative ends."'' 0 The
found a state statute setting different ages of majority for men and women unconstitutional "under any test-compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in between." Id. at 17. See also Note, The Mandate for a New Equal Protection Model, 24
CATH. U.L. REv. 558, 559 n.10 (1975).
" For other developments in corporate equal protection see Blackmun, The Implications of Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.: Weakening or Eliminating Equal
Protection for Corporations as a Class, 16 ARIz. L. REv. 41 (1974).
Gunther, supra note 2, at 20.
" Id. at 18-20, 33-37.
,' Id. at 21, 26-30. The model has been betrayed in at least one decision. In United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), the Court held that a congressional desire to harm "hippies" as a group could not be a permissible purpose under the
equal protection requirement of the fifth amendment's due process clause. For commentary on this aspect of Gunther's model see Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review
Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive
Classifications,62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1071-72 (1974); Note, The Mandate for a New Equal
Protection Model, 24 CATm. U.L. REv. 558, 561-63 (1975); Comment, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno-The "Red Herring" of Social Welfare, 23 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1485 (1974).
02 Gunther, supra note 2, at 20.
It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that
have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it
would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on
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sliding-scale approach which Justice Marshall has advocated is
the second model for a "newer" equal protection." 3 This model
would focus "upon the character of the classification in question,
the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and
the state interests asserted in support of the classification."' 4 The
more invidious the classification, the more important the interest
affected, and the less important the governmental interest, the
more rigorous should be the Court's analysis.'
The Supreme Court has never formally adopted either
model. Indeed, the Court has never brought these two theories
together in a head-to-head clash, but the Second Circuit did in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.0 In examining an exclusionary
the basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to
rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Id. at 21. See also Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
I'll Justice Marshall's most recent exposition of this model came in his dissent in
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2568 (1976). His most elaborate statement of this model was in dissent in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973). From time to time other Justices have flirted with the
idea of a sliding scale. Justice Powell articulated a sliding scale in Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 409 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972). Such an approach was noticeably absent in his
more elaborate opinion for the Court in Rodriguez. However, Justice Blackmun adopted
the sliding scale proposed by Justice Poweil in Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 2761
(1976). Justice Blackmun may have also been alluding to a sliding scale in Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975). In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973), Justice
White proclaimed that the Court has all along used a spectrum of standards in equal
protection. Finally, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451,
464-65 (1976), implicitly seems to adopt a sliding-scale method of analysis. Although his
opinion specifically rejects two-tier and three-tier analysis, and conversely, specifically
adopts a single standard, that single standard is strongly suggestive of a sliding scale.
'"I Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. at 2569. Other cases in
which Justice Marshall has articulated this approach are: City of Charlotte v. Local 660,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 96 S. Ct. 2036 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974);
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Justice Black's opinion in Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
1'0This is really little more than a sophisticated balancing test. Note, The Mandate
for a New Equal Protection Model, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 558, 585-87 (1975).
'o 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). For an excellent discussion
of the conflicting majority and dissenting opinions in the court of appeals, see Note,
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 508
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zoning ordinance Judges Mansfield and Oakes applied "a flexible
and equitable approach, which permits consideration to be given
to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of it."' ' The intensity of review
under this test would depend on the relative value of the rights
affected.10 To pass muster, the majority judges in Boraas observed, legislative classifications must "in fact" have a substantial relationship to a legitimate purpose. 0 The dissenting judge,
Timbers, declined the invitation to apply this test. Although he
admitted that Supreme Court decisions indicated a departure
from traditional two-tier analysis, he did not feel the Court had
gone so far as to adopt the sliding-scale approach. He applied
Gunther's model, but he did so less by way of conviction than by
way of argument."10 In four sentences, however, he was able to
capture the nature of the conflict between these two models.
A "sliding scale" approach may be appropriate in some contexts,
but it seems to me inappropriate here. A court should not be required to attempt the impossible task of first assessing the precise
value of the right or interest and then increasing or decreasing the
intensity of its scrutiny accordingly. This approach would confer
upon a judge wide discretion to overturn state and local legislation
based largely on his own estimate of the value of competing interests-a highly abstract and individualistic determination.
The recent Supreme Court decisions, in my view, require a
judge to make only the narrow value judgments needed in evaluating means."'
(1974). The sliding scale was also applied by Justice Roberts in dissent in Mcllvaine v.
Pennsylvania, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
Note, The ConstitutionalChallenge to Mandatory Retirement Statutes, 49 ST. JOHN'S L.

REv. 748, 749-52 (1975).
"7 476 F.2d at 814. Compare Justice Marshall's model in text accompanying note 104
supra.
'

476 F.2d at 821 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
Id. at 815 n.8.

"' Id. at 822. Judge Timbers was unconvinced that Supreme Court cases relied upon
by the majority judges offered sound bases for formulating a general invigorated theory
of minimum scrutiny. For example, he found Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), to reflect
"an unexpressed special suspicion of sex classifications." 476 F.2d at 820. He also argued
that Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), was so closely related to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as to justify intense scrutiny on that basis alone. 476 F.2d

at 820-21.
"1 476 F.2d at 821 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, Judge Timbers indicated the

Supreme Court may have adopted this "means-focused test" as a "technique to avoid the
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What Timbers was rebelling against here is the same thing that
bothered the Supreme Court in Rodriguez. The sliding scale does
not articulate fixed standards for determining which interests
and classifications should weigh more heavily than others-the
critical element in deciding what degrees of scrutiny to apply. In
this respect the sliding scale is a near mirror-image of the Warren
Court's ill-defined process for identifying suspect classifications
and fundamental constitutional interests-an approach the Supreme Court rather resoundingly rejected in Rodriguez."2 But to
this objection, Justice Marshall gave an answer of sorts in
Rodriguez, and whether or not he had in mind Judge Timbers'
objections, his answer is at least responsive to the question Judge
Timbers raised.
The majority is, of course, correct when it suggests that the
process of determining which interests are fundamental is a difficult
one. But I do not think the problem is insurmountable. And I certainly do not accept the view that the process need necessarily degenerate into an unprincipled, subjective "picking-and-choosing"
between various interests or that it must involve this Court in creating "substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws,"

. . .

. Although not all fundamental

interests are constitutionally guaranteed, the determination of
which interests are fundamental should be firmly rooted in the text
of the Constitution. The task in every case should be to determine
the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus
between the specific constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes
more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when
the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted
accordingly. .

.

. Only if we closely protect the related interests

from state discrimination do we ultimately ensure the integrity of
the constitutional guarantee itself. This is the real lesson that must
be taken from our previous decisions involving interests deemed to
be fundamental.'

However much Justice Marshall feels this gives certainty to the
process of determining the relative degree of scrutiny which
should be applied, the similarity of this approach to that of the
troublesome value judgments required to identify new and fundamental interests." Id. at
821 n.3. At the time this was written Rodriguez had not yet been decided. Id. at 827 n.1
(Timbers, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc).
"'2

"

See text accompanying notes 9-32 supra.
411 U.S. at 102-03 (footnote omitted).
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Warren Court and the strong rejection of that approach by the
Burger Court in Rodriguez would seem to destine Marshall's sliding scale to heroic dissents and oblique references in occasional,
marginally important decisions." 4
In contrast to the apparent rejection of Marshall's sliding
scale, Gunther's model has never been clearly rejected by the
Court and has been often cited. Yet, it remains in limbo. In the
first place, insofar as it predicted that the Court would look to the
means rather than the ends of legislative choices, it has not been
entirely accurate." 5 More significant, its emphasis on a meansoriented rather than "purposes" analysis has the appearance of
a semantic argument akin to the debate over whether the chicken
or the egg came first. For example, in United States Department
of Agriculture v. Moreno"6 the Court spoke of the denial of food
stamps to "hippies" as being an impermissible legislative
purpose. In that Moreno finds the purpose, rather than the
means, a violation of equal protection, it violates a cardinal principle of the Gunther model. It is, however, possible to reconcile
this case with the model, because, although the Court may have
been particularly upset with a vicious classification, it may be
argued that the classification did not rationally further the legislative goal of preventing welfare fraud. So construed, Moreno is
a "means-focused" opinion and consistent with Gunther's model.
An examination of some of the other cases on which Gunther
relies would, conversely, show that they could be construed as
inconsistent with the model. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company"7 is an example. Here the Court examined a workmen's
compensation system which disadvantaged illegitimate children
seeking recovery upon the death of the insured. The scheme was
rationalized by the state as protecting and furthering legitimate
family ties. Striking the statute down could be interpreted as
consistent with Gunther's model, since the means chosen did not
substantially further this interest. On the other hand, a close
"I A watered-down version of the sliding scale is visible in Marshall's opinion for the
Court in City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 96 S. Ct. 2036 (1976).
Arguably, this case is an example of how a balancing of the respective rights and interests
can result in a relatively less intense degree of scrutiny under the sliding-scale approach.
"'
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
Id.
"'

406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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reading of the case suggests that the Court was most offended by
the apparent statutory purpose of visiting punishment for the
parent's sins on the heads of the illegitimate children.'", Thus
construed, Weber is, like Moreno, inconsistent with the Gunther
model. Likewise, some of the Court's decisions dealing with
gender-based discriminations can be analyzed as consistent or
inconsistent with Gunther's model, depending on whether one
prefers means or purpose-focused analysis. The Court's decisions
in the area of sex would seem to be better explained, moreover,
as resulting from a rebuttable judicial presumption, that genderbased discriminations do not serve a constitutionally permissible
purpose." 9 The fact that these cases are at least as susceptible to
purpose-focused as means-focused analysis undermines the credibility of the Gunther model. It would be a mistake for litigants
who are urging that a statute be found unconstitutional to couch
their arguments solely in terms of whether the means substantially further a legitimate state purpose, and to assume that the
purpose is legitimate. Litigants should also argue, in an appropriate case, that the purpose behind the legislation, whether facially
apparent or to be inferred from a history of similar discriminations, is one that is not within the state's power to pursue. However the courts write their opinions, the legitimacy of the underlying purpose will continue to play an important role. To some this
will be a return to substantive due process, but such complaints
20
are the usual last resort of constitutional dissents.
Gunther's model also seems inadequate in describing the
degree or intensity of review which the Court would apply.
Gunther's only statement with regard to the intensity of review
under this "interventionist" model was that it would require
Accord, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In his
concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren, supra, Justice Stevens found the statute which set
a higher minimum age for men than women in the purchase of 3.2 beer "a mere remnant
of the now almost universally rejected tradition of discriminating against males in this
age bracket." 97 S. Ct. at 465 (footnote omitted). See also the majority and dissenting
opinions in Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976). Judge Timbers said, in his dissent
in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, that the Supreme Court's opinions reflect "an unexpressed special suspicion of sex classifications." 476 F.2d at 820.
I"' Cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
's

"'
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"legislative means to substantially further legislative ends."' 2 '
This tells us very little about the actual intensity of review or how
it differs from old minimum scrutiny. More significantly, to the
extent that Gunther's model predicted intensified review on a
general rather than selective basis, it is erroneous.' 22 Beyond the
areas of sex and illegitimacy, intensified scrutiny has enjoyed
little application. 23 As a caveat, intensified review in Eisenstadt
v. Baird'24 can be attributed to its resemblance to Griswold v.
Connecticut'2M and the unusual penalty, pregnancy, which the
statute would inflict for premarital and extramarital sex.' 25
,2,
Gunther, supra note 2, at 20.
'2 Among the cases where intensified review is glaringly absent are: Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976) (employment of "aged" persons); City
of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976) (economic regulation); Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (exclusionary zoning); Marshall v. United States, 414
U.S. 417 (1974) (criminal law); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (education and poverty); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (voting).
'2 See note 110 supra. Occasionally intensified scrutiny is applied in the area of
criminal law. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972). Thus, while the Court seems unwilling to follow Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), or Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in applying strict scrutiny to these
areas of criminal law, United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976) and Ross v.
Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court will reserve intensified review for the most noxious
of schemes, James v. Strange, supra, and Jackson v. Indiana, supra. In James, Kansas
had a system for recouping attorney's fees from indigent criminal defendants. In order to
facilitate collection of this debt, the state deprived the debtor of the usual exemptions
afforded to other debtors, such as the homestead exemption. The Supreme Court found
this measure deprived the indigent debtor of the equal protection of the laws afforded to
other debtors, because it deprived this narrow class of debtors of the means to keep their
families together and made it more difficult for this class of persons to get on their feet
again financially. Jackson v. Indiana, supra, is less a hallmark of intensified review than
of revulsion to a proceeding that bore not the slightest trappings of fairness, and for that
reason could have been decided on due process grounds alone. A 27-year-old, mentallydeficient, deaf-mute, who could neither read nor write and who was only able to communicate by sign-language at the level of a pre-school child, was committed to custody until
he became capable of understanding the criminal charges which were filed against him.
As his attorney pointed out, the defendant's mental condition was permanent and he
would never gain the ability to understand the charges against him so as to be able to
stand trial. In effect, the defendant had been committed to confinement for life, a term
much longer than that provided for the acts with which he was charged. In addition, it is
much more difficult to obtain the defendant's release from custody of this nature than
from civil custody which is imposed because of the defendant's inability to care for
himself. Altogether, this was too much for the Supreme Court.
MZ,405 U.S. 438 (1972).
'
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' The reach of either Griswold or Eisenstadt as a general constitutional attack on
statutes criminalizing nonmarital sex was apparently restricted in Doe v. Common-
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Even in respect to gender-based classifications, 7 and those
relating to illegitimacy,' the Court's application of intensified
review has been erratic. Among the Court's decisions relating to
gender-based discriminations, Kahn v. Shevin 2 1 and Geduldig v.
Aiello'30 take a condescending approach rather than what might
be described as an intensified form of review. 3' Kahn upheld a
wealth's Atty., 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976), aff'g without opinion 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975). For a discussion of this case see Comment, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney:
Closing the Door to a FundamentalRight of Sexual Privacy, 53 DENVER L.J. 553 (1976).
I" Among the most significant Burger Court cases considering gender-based discrimination are: Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Kahn
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). Weinberger, Schlesinger, and Frontiero arose under federal law and
therefore applied fifth amendment equal protection. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361
(1974); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
I" Burger Court decisions implicating the rights of illegitimate children include:
Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New
Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971). Two decisions from the Warren Court should also be kept in mind when
considering the rights of illegitimates: Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968) and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
' 416 U.S. 351 (1974). For commentary see Erickson, Kahn, Ballard and Wiesenfeld:
A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L.
Rav. 1 (1975); Note, PreferentialEconomic Treatment for Women: Some Constitutional
and PracticalImplications of Kahn v. Shevin, 28 VAND. L. REv. 843 (1975).
IN 417 U.S. 484 (1974). For a 1976 Term case closely following Geduldig but doing so
under Title VII see, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976). For commentary
on Geduldig see Larson, Sex Discriminationas to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L.J. 805;
Schair, Sex Discrimination:The Pregnancy-RelatedDisabilitiesException, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 684 (1975); Note, Sex Discrimination in Employee Benefits, 17 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 109 (1975); Comment, PregnancyDisabilityBenefits Under State-AdministeredInsurance Programs, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 263 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definitions of Sex Discrimination,75 COLUM. L. REV. 441
(1975).
'3' Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), can also be criticized for taking a
paternalistic approach to gender-based discrimination. This case upheld a mandatory
retirement program for naval officers which had the effect of forcing earlier retirement for
male officers than female officers. A majority of the Court upheld this plan as being based
on a realistic assessment that promotional opportunities were more readily available in
the Navy to men than women. Since mandatory retirement for male officers was related
to promotions, the majority felt this scheme was fair. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White dissented. Justice Brennan would have measured all gender-based discrimination by the compelling interest standard, as he regards sex as a suspect classification. He went on to say that a benign racial or gender-based classification might pass that
test, if in fact the differential treatment was both intentional and designed to achieve
equality for all groups who were not equally situated. He did not find these factors present
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tax exemption for widows, but similarly situated widowers were
not granted the exemption. Florida justifiedthe special treatment
of widows as compensating them for the extensive economic discrimination against women generally and as a method of alleviating loss of income by reason of the death of the marital party who
was more likely providing marital income. Since sex is not recognized as a suspect classification, the majority found that this
ameliorative purpose rationally justified the legislation.' 2 Brennan's dissent lashed out at this reasoning as exemplary of stereotyping which has characterized women as helpless and weak. Although he would agree that women had been discriminated
against as a class, and that legislation for the purpose of assisting
economically disadvantaged women would serve a compelling
interest, the Florida statute failed to satisfy the standard of strict
scrutiny which he believed was appropriate because it was not
narrowly drawn for the benefit of needy widows only.' 33 Statutes
such as those in Kahn, which provide a benefit to widows generally, and not merely to those who have been victims of discrimination, discriminate against widowers in violation of equal protection. In any event, the majority's position in Kahn, affording
preferential treatment to widows generally, not merely those who

are victims of discrimination, and at the same time allowing similarly situated widowers to be denied this benefit, would seem to
fall short of anything like intensified review.
The majority position in Geduldig v. Aiello is even more
irreconcilable with an intensified form of review. There, a California disability insurance program provided substitute income to
those unable to work because of a disability not covered by workmen's compensation. With some very narrow exemptions all disabilities were covered, except for pregnancy. The majority upheld
this discrimination on the transparently specious reasoning that
in Ballard and he criticized the majority for going too far in imagining justifiable purposes
which "may" underlie the congressional scheme, as the legislative history did not support
a congressional intent to benefit women naval officers as a disadvantaged class. For
commentary see Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test
in "Reverse" DiscriminationCases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. Rlv. 1 (1975).
,31 In reaching this holding, the Court relied upon Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,
419-20 (1908) wherein it was observed that the physical condition of women justified
special protective legislation for women as a class. 416 U.S. at 356 n.10. Muller is a model
of paternalism.
"' See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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the program did not deny benefits on the basis of sex, but did
deny benefits on the basis of an "objectively identifiable physical
condition with unique characteristics."'' 4 To this the Court gratuitously added that there was no risk for which men were covered
and women were not and vice versa.' 35 Justice Brennan's dissent
again urged that classifications based on sex be subject to strict
13
scrutiny.
Gunther predicted the Court would employ a form of intensified scrutiny which would require legislative means to substantially further legislative ends. He did not suggest the Court would
apply varying degrees of review. Court decisions would indicate,
however, that it has not been applying one, intensified degree of
3 7 the Court seemed
review. In Kahn and Schlesinger v. Ballard'
134417

U.S. at 496 n.20.
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit
eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true
that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like
those in Reed, supra, and Frontiero,supra...
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such
under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis.
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women
and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes.
Id. at 496-97 n.20. To illustrate the hypocrisy of this crafty definition of the relevant
classes, the following hypothetical is posed. A similar insurance program includes all
disabilities except sickle cell anemia. As a practical matter, only Blacks acquire this
disease. Paraphrasing footnote 20: "The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-diseased Blacks and nondiseased persons. While the first group is exclusively
black, the second includes Blacks and non-Blacks." This logic is sophistic. The system
described is racially discriminatory. For the same reasons, the system in Geduldig discriminated on the basis of sex. For a similar critique see Justice Brennan's dissent in
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401, 416 n.5 (1976).
'" 417 U.S. at 496-97. In the field of race, the Court has held that mere equal application of the laws is not an end to constitutional inquiry under the equal protection clause.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966).
"1 417 U.S. at 503. Justice Brennan rejected the majority's conclusion that the
increased costs to the program for extending coverage to pregnancy disabilities could
justify this exclusion. 417 U.S. at 501 n.5. Geduldig came before the Court postured solely
on the constitutional issues. Guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission in 1972 would forbid such practices under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1970). EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1975). In a 1976 Term case the Supreme Court held that the Commission's regulation was an inaccurate interpretation of Title VII. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
1- 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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to apply a reduced level of intensity when reviewing legislation
which treated women more favorably than men, while it applied
a more intense review in Frontiero v. Richardson3 8 when the only
question involved was discrimination adversely affecting women.
In Craig v. Boren, a case involving discrimination against men,
Justice Brennan said that "classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,"'' 9 a test which four
1- 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
1'
97 S. Ct. 451, 457 (1976). In Califano v. Goldfarb, 45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (U.S. Mar. 2,
1977), a plurality of four Justices applied this more intense form of review in affirming a
lower court decision which found unconstitutional sex discrimination in social security
survivors benefits under the Federal Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-31 (1970). Under the plan, widows of insured husbands were entitled to
benefits as a matter of law on the death of the husband. Widowers of insured wives were
eligible only if they could show that at the time of the wife's death, she was providing
more than one-half of the husband's support. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion for
affirmance was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and White. Justice Stevens filed a
separate opinion for affirmance. Justice Brennan found in this program discrimination
against the women who had contributed social security taxes. Their spouses would not
receive the same protection as the spouses of male insureds, since male survivors who
could not prove dependency would not receive benefits at all, whereas survivors of male
insureds received the benefits in all cases, even if they were not in fact dependent. Relying
on Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), Justice Brennan concluded that a program which presumes all women are
dependent on their spouses is a product of traditional "role-typing" which has been found
to violate equal protection. In contrast to Justice Stevens and the dissenters, Justice
Brennan refused to analyze this scheme in terms of discrimination against the surviving
husband, which would have brought the case closer to Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). More importantly, he distinguished Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975),
which had held that social welfare programs would violate the constitution only if the
discriminations they created were 'utterly lacking in rational justification."' 422 U.S. at
768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). Where, as in Califano v.
Goldfarb, the discrimination is based on gender-based classifications, Craig v. Boren
requires the classification to satisfy the more rigorous intermediate standard: It must serve
"important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." 97 S. Ct. at 457.
Justice Stevens agreed with the four dissenters that the program should be measured
against the justification of administrative convenience espoused in Mathews v. Lucas, 96
S. Ct. 2755 (1976). Alternatively, he would have upheld the program had it been motivated
by a congressional desire to cushion the widow's loss of the income-producing spouse, as
in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Unlike the dissenters, however, Justice Stevens
found that this scheme satisfied neither of these justifications. In so doing, he relied on
data in Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion which showed that about 10% of all widows
were not in fact dependent. Payments to nondependent widows thus cost the government
approximately $1 billion dollars annually. 45 U.S.L.W. at 4243 n.5. Considering the rather
staggering costs imposed for the purpose of "administrative convenience," Justice Stevens
could not accept this as justifying the different treatment of widows and widowers. Since
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other Justices found to be the equivalent of "middle-tier"
analysis. But then, in Geduldig, the Court seemed to have retreated all the way back to traditional, deferential minimum
scrutiny. In this setting it would be unrealistic to argue that the
Court has applied one degree of intensified review in cases dealing
with sex. Indeed, the levels of review in this area seem paternalistic, depending on what the Justices believe is best on a case-bycase approach.'4

Thus, Professor Gunther's model, while it has never been
repudiated by the Supreme Court, fails to explain the Court's
modes of analysis. Rather than one intensified level of review,
there seem to be many. Economic regulation, receiving the least
scrutiny, is the bottom line. Strict scrutiny is the upper limit. In
between there are varying degrees of review. Decisions in the area
of sex have not been favored with a consistent intermediate intensity of review, and the same is true of decisions affecting illegitimates.'4 '
Oddly enough, just where Gunther's model fails, Marshall's
sliding scale seems to succeed, though maybe not as he would
wish. Insofar as the Court's scrutiny bears the marks of consistency at all, it seems to depend on the majority's view of the
nature of the classification,4 2 the importance of the interest afthere was no evidence that Congress had in fact intended this differential treatment to
compensate widows as the victims of historic sex discrimination, he was also unwilling to
uphold discrimination against widowers on the bald assertion that it was so intended by
Congress.
"I Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in
"Reverse" Sex DiscriminationCases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 53 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 441, 456-62 (1975). The Court's attitude can best be summarized in the
words of one of its members, Justice Stewart: "[Tihe female of the species has the best
of both worlds. She can attack laws that unreasonably discriminate against her while
preserving those that favor her." HARv. L. SCH. Rac. 15 (March 23, 1973), quoted in
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution,44 U. CiN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1975). The inferior legal
and economic status of women is the product of this chivalrous mode of thought. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-87 (1973) (plurality opinion).
"I Compare Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976) with Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974). Compare Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) with
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
,2 Classifications relating to sex have been regarded more suspiciously than any other
classification excepting those actually ranked as suspect classifications. E.g., Craig v.
Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). Illegitimacy is regarded
less suspiciously than sex. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976). Almost every other
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fected, 43 and the importance of the governmental interest promoted by the legislative program."' The difference between Justice Marshall's sliding scale and that of other Justices who apply
it or recognize it' is probably less in the mechanics of the-test
than it is in the more subjective evaluation of what importance
should be attached to the various elements that are weighed in
the balance. While Justice Marshall has articulated a "nexus
classification is given even less scrutiny than sex and illegitimacy: E.g., age, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); poverty, San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
1,3The only interests which have consistently demanded much in the way of intensified review are those relating to the conduct of family life and the decision of whether or
not to beget children. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972). Other traditionally important interests, such as employment,
education, housing, and welfare, have not seemed to merit the Court's intensified review.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976); San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
"I Administrative convenience and fiscal conservation are the two governmental interests most frequently advanced. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The number and variety of governmental interests that can
be advanced is as endless as the advocate's imagination.
"' Justice Blackmun, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975), Justice Powell,
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972), and Justice White, Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (concurring opinion), have variously advocated or
recognized a sliding-scale approach to equal protection. Justice Stevens may have done
so inferentially in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief
Justice Burger criticized this approach in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 461 (1973)
(dissenting opinion), as did Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in Rodriguez, 411
U.S. at 59.
At least three members of the Court, the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, have clung to the view that the only legislation which will violate equal protection is that which is totally lacking in rationality, in the spirit of McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961), and Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The
Chief Justice expressed his preference for this standard in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451,
467 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stewart concurred in Rodriguez because the
legislative scheme was not wholly arbitrary and capricious, although he would admit that
it was "chaotic and unjust." 411 U.S. at 59. Justice Rehnquist has carried this absurd
standard one step further. He has said that equal protection "requires neither that state
enactments be 'logical' nor does it require that they be 'just' in the common meaning of
those terms. It requires only that there be some conceivable set of facts that may justify
the classification involved." Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 183 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). At least in application, if not in articulation, Justice Stewart's threshold
for an equal protection violation measured by what is "totally irrational" is lower than
that of the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. Compare the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart with the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist in
Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976). Justice Powell rejected that standard for measuring
an equal protection violation, condemning the discrimination against illegitimates in
Weber as "illogical and unjust." 406 U.S. at 175.
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theory" for weighing these interests,'4 6 that theory was rejected by
the majority in Rodriguez. But the "nexus theory" may have been
rejected by the majority in Rodriguez less because of the theory
per se, than because of Marshall's interpretation of it. Marshall
is, of course, associated with that wing of the Court which has
emphasized the importance of individual liberties and civil rights
in the constitutional setting. By contrast, the majority Justices
in Rodriguez have leaned in the other direction, strengthening
governmental powers. The "nexus theory" to which the
Rodriguez majority objected was one which valued highly the
rights of citizens generally. This majority has, nonetheless, applied a "nexus theory" of its own, more selective and narrow, and
possibly more subjective than Marshall's. Justice Marshall's
standard for intensifying review would depend upon the connexity between the right denied and rights enshrined in the Constitution. By contrast, the Burger Court has intensified review in only
a few areas, and then inconsistently. It seems evident, however,
that the degree of review is a function of which interests are
deemed more important and which classifications are suspicious,
if not suspect, in the minds of a majority of the Burger Court.
CONCLUSION

In 1968 Richard Nixon promised to appoint more conservative Justices to the Supreme Court. His four appointees have
combined to form the core of the present conservative majority.
This majority's reaction against the broader implications of the
''new" equal protection is reflected in its reformulation of equal
protection analysis.
The most dramatic change has occurred in the area of strict
scrutiny. Although strict scrutiny is of relatively recent vintage,
the new majority was unable or unwilling to throw it out completely. Instead, by narrowly reading precedent, the Court limited the range of cases to which it would apply the compelling
interest standard. Willing to make hard-nosed distinctions from
some of the Warren Court's less tightly reasoned opinions, this
new majority was able to restrict strict scrutiny without actually
overruling prior decisions.
Seemingly at the expense of strict scrutiny, traditional or
-,See text accompanying notes 28-32, 113 supra.
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minimal scrutiny found itself armed with new strength, sometimes. While the Court has attempted to clothe its restriction of
strict scrutiny with the appearance of objectivity, developments
with respect to minimum scrutiny have been highly subjective
and selective. For the most part, the invigorated and varying
degrees of review have been carried out under the guise of a single
standard-the traditional, deferential rational basis test. It is
clear, however, that the traditional rational basis test has not
always been applied. Depending upon the classification or interests involved, the Court may apply more stringent levels of review, very much in the nature of Justice Marshall's sliding scale.
The principal differences between Justice Marshall and the majority on this point are two. First, Justice Marshall weighs more
heavily civil rights and civil liberties than does the Burger Court
majority, which more frequently gives great weight to the interests of the government. Second, Justice Marshall admits that he
applies a sliding scale.
From the model bequeathed to it by the Warren Court, the
Burger Court has fashioned an equal protection more to its liking
and manipulation. On the one hand, it has narrowly interpreted
precedent in the area of strict scrutiny, thereby forcing more decisions to be decided by lower tier scrutiny. On the other hand, by
selectively and subjectively escalating the intensity of review to
be applied in the lower tier, the Court has been able to achieve
the same results as by strict scrutiny, without being locked into
a holding that the classification is suspect or that the interest is
fundamental in the constitutional sense. Consequently, the Court
has given itself the freedom to arrive at diametrically opposed
results in future cases involving the same classification or interest.
Michael P. O'Connell

